Erschienen in:Sauder School of Business Working Paper
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (49 p)
Sprache:
Nicht zu entscheiden
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.510282
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 2004 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This article examines managerial ownership structure and at-issue yield spreads on corporate bonds. There is a positive relation between managerial ownership and borrowing costs, and this relation is weaker at higher levels of ownership. In addition, managerial stock options have a larger effect on yield spreads than stock ownership. These effects exist after controlling for firm and bond characteristics, and are robust to endogeneity and sample selection concerns. The evidence suggests that rational bondholders use the information about a firm's future risk choices contained in managerial incentives structures when pricing new debt issues, and that lenders anticipate higher risk-taking incentives from managerial stock options than from equity ownership