• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: Bankruptcy Auctions : CEO Turnover, Compensation Changes and Firm Performance
  • Beteiligte: Thorburn, Karin S. [VerfasserIn]
  • Erschienen: [S.l.]: SSRN, [1998]
  • Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (36 p)
  • Sprache: Nicht zu entscheiden
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.141473
  • Identifikator:
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 1998 erstellt
  • Beschreibung: This paper provides some first, large-sample evidence on CEO turnover, compensation changes and corporate performance following bankruptcy auctions, using data from Sweden. Two-thirds of CEOs lose their jobs through the auction, and the median compensation loss is 40% over the two years following filing. While CEO turnover and compensation effects are dramatic, post-bankruptcy operating performance of firms auctioned as going concerns is typically at par with industry competitors. Thus, there is little evidence of delayed filing at the detriment of the firm's going concern value. Overall, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that bankruptcy auctions force turnover of inefficient CEOs. These results contrast with extant evidence on Chapter 11 renegotiations
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang