• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: Externalities, Incentives, Government Failure, and the Coronavirus Outbreak
  • Beteiligte: de Oliveira Souza, Thiago [Verfasser:in]
  • Erschienen: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2020]
  • Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (20 p)
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3583160
  • Identifikator:
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 23, 2020 erstellt
  • Beschreibung: This paper derives and simulates a compartmental model of the Coronavirus outbreak in which individuals have self-interested reactions to the threat of infection, proportional to the heterogeneous risk of complications that they face. As long as high-risk individuals perceive infection as sufficiently undesirable, the externalities created by the free circulation of low-risk individuals are positive and potentially reduce the total number of infections by approximately 100 million in the U.S. (including every high-risk individual). In this case, the social interaction of low-risk individuals should be subsidized, according to the same market failure arguments used to justify broad confinement mandates, which constitute government failures
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang