Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 10, 2020 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We study optimal exchange of private information in a two-player all-pay auction contest with independent private values. A benevolent information center who is informed about the players' values facilitates the exchange of information by disclosing a signal publicly. We characterize all equilibria of the all-pay auction in such a setting. The informativeness of the signal determines the monotonicity of the equilibrium strategy and the players' expected payoff. Utilizing particular features of the different equilibria, we characterize all optimal signals that maximize the players' expected payoff. When the players are ex ante sufficiently heterogeneous, the optimal signals work through an information rent channel by inducing allocative efficient contests. When the players are ex ante sufficiently homogeneous, the optimal signals work through a softening competition channel by inducing asymmetric contests. In order to guarantee efficient allocation, a regulator can punish any exchange of information when the players are sufficiently homogeneous and impose no restrictions when they are sufficiently heterogeneous