Erschienen in:INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, 59 (2), pp. 391-419, 2018
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (49 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3533352
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 1, 2018 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This paper contrasts two auction formats often used in public procurement: first price auctions with ex-post screening of bid responsiveness and average bid auctions, in which the bidder closest to the average bid wins. The equilibrium analysis reveals that their ranking is ambiguous in terms of revenues, but the average bid auction is typically less efficient. Using a data set of Italian public procurement auctions run alternately under the two formats, a structural model of bidding is estimated for the sub-sample of first price auctions and used to quantify the efficiency loss under counterfactual average bid auctions