Brandi, Clara A.
[Verfasser:in]
;
Blümer, Dominique
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Morin, Jean-Frederic
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2019 erstellt
Beschreibung:
The increasing uptake of environmental provisions in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) is well documented, but little is known about why countries prefer certain types of provisions over others. This contribution exploits a fine-grained data-set on environmental provisions in PTAs and hypothesizes that environmental provisions are more likely to be adopted when they aim at preserving countries' regulatory sovereignty. It finds that the likelihood of adoption is indeed higher for defensive provisions, but this likelihood decreases if there is a large variation in PTA members' stringency of environmental regulations, and in particular, for PTAs with asymmetric power relationships. The results suggest that, while countries first and foremost attempt to preserve their regulatory sovereignty when adopting environmental provisions, countries with stringent environmental regulations and strong bargaining power vis-à-vis their trading partners also try to level the playing field and pursue more offensive interests