Bertomeu, Jeremy
[Verfasser:in]
;
Cheynel, Edwige
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Li, Edward Xuejun
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Liang, Ying
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Is Earnings Management Really Rampant? Evidence from a Structural Model
Erschienen in:Baruch College Zicklin School of Business Research Paper ; No. 2018-04-02
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (37 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3153047
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 29, 2020 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We derive a measure of earnings management cost and the associated equilibrium level of earnings management from the cross-sectional properties of earnings and prices. This approach enables us to separate economic shocks from reporting discretion by modeling the economic trade-off faced by management. The trade-off can be easily estimated from a closed-form likelihood function. Overall, the estimates suggest that earnings management is modest, consistent with the conjecture in Ball (2013) that earnings management is not as rampant as what prior research would suggest. Consistent with prior studies, the measure suggests more earnings management during seasoned equity offerings, for smaller and growing firms, as well as in industries with more irregularities