• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: You Need to Recognize Ambiguity to Avoid it
  • Beteiligte: Chew, Soo Hong [Verfasser:in]; Ratchford, Mark [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Sagi, Jacob S. [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
  • Erschienen: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2020]
  • Erschienen in: Vanderbilt Owen Graduate School of Management Research Paper ; No. 2340543
  • Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (38 p)
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2340543
  • Identifikator:
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 14, 2013 erstellt
  • Beschreibung: We study the influence of attention and comprehension on ambiguity attitudes. Subjects are presented with screening questions before choosing between two alternatives represented by payoff-matrices which are essentially equivalent to those in Ellsberg's (1961) two-urn problem. The observed rate of ambiguity aversion for the standard two-urn problem is similar to what is reported in the literature regardless of the level of comprehension. When facing the essentially equivalent yet more complex matrix-based choice task, high-comprehension subjects continue to exhibit ambiguity aversion typical of the standard two-urn problem while low-comprehension subjects appear to behave randomly. We also classify subjects as “probability minded” or “ambiguity minded” based on whether they assign probabilities to draws from a deck of cards with unknown composition during the screening phase. High-comprehension subjects who are ambiguity-minded are far more likely to be ambiguity averse than those who are probability-minded. Significantly, subject “mindedness” appears to explain ambiguity attitudes an order of magnitude more than all other demographic characteristics combined. Contrary to intuition about subjects' sophistication, ambiguity-minded high-comprehension subjects are younger, more educated, more analytic, and more reflective about their choices compared with their probability-minded counterparts
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang