Anmerkungen:
In: Journal of International Economic Law, 2019
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 5, 2019 erstellt
Beschreibung:
In the wake of the mega-FTAs, such as RCEP and TPP and its successor, the CPTPP, all of the ten ASEAN member countries are determined to participate in the RCEP and to maintain the ASEAN centrality whereas Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam have also opted for the CPTPP. In view of divergent positions of ASEAN member countries, this paper asks two questions: empirically, what drives individual ASEAN member states toward the RCEP or TPP; normatively, do the different positions embraced by ASEAN member countries weaken the coherence of ASEAN external relations and undermine the centrality of ASEAN in Asian regionalism. I argued that Singapore's participation in the TPP is mainly motivated its wish to set the rules of FTAs in the Asian Pacific and to steer economic integration in the region. Brunel, given its economic structure, joined the P3FTA and turned it into P4 Agreement aims to undergo economic reform through international commitments and diversity its domestic economy. Vietnam and Malaysia joined the TPP out for the access to American market but Vietnam's TPP participation can also be situated in the context of its aggressive FTA strategy. In view of these different rationales, Trump's withdrawal from the TPP impact unevenly on these four countries. This paper argues that solidarity within ASEAN member countries does not prevent economically advanced member countries from participating in the CPTPP for market access, nonetheless, the need of CLM should be taken care of through special and differential treatment in RCEP negotiations