• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: How Often Do Managers Withhold Information?
  • Beteiligte: Bertomeu, Jeremy [Verfasser:in]; Ma, Paul [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Marinovic, Ivan [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
  • Erschienen: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2019]
  • Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (52 p)
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2741778
  • Identifikator:
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 12, 2019 erstellt
  • Beschreibung: We estimate a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure, using annual management forecasts of earnings, that features a manager with price motives and an uncertain but persistent information endowment. Our estimates imply that: (i) managers face disclosure frictions 35% of the time; (ii) conditional on being informed, managers withhold information 17% of the time; and (iii) conditional on being silent, managers possess information 24% of the time. Managers' strategic withholding motives increase investors' uncertainty about earnings by 3%. We find that managers' price motives reduce strategic withholding by one-third, in response to investors' increased skepticism in the event of non-disclosure
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang