Lin, Leming
[Verfasser:in]
;
Mihov, Atanas
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Sanz, Leandro
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Stoyanova, Detelina
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Property Rights Institutions, Foreign Investment, and the Valuation of Multinational Firms
Anmerkungen:
In: Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 7, 2017 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We study the effect of property rights institutions in host countries, the institutions protecting investors from expropriation by host country agents, on the geographic structure and valuation of U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs). We provide firm-level evidence that better property rights attract investment from MNCs. We disentangle the effects of the Stulz (2005) "twin agency problems" in the context of foreign direct investment, and show that our results are not driven by legal institutions protecting investors from expropriation by corporate insiders. Further, we show that changes in the quality of property rights in locations where MNCs operate have material impact on MNCs' valuations