• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: Labor-market Frictions, Incomplete Insurance and Severance Payments
  • Beteiligte: Lalé, Etienne [Verfasser:in]
  • Erschienen: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2019]
  • Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (37 p)
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2534431
  • Identifikator:
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: In: Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 31, January 2019, Pages 411-435
    Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 1, 2018 erstellt
  • Beschreibung: We analyze the effects of government-mandated severance payments in a rich life-cycle model with search-matching frictions in the labor market, risk-averse agents and imperfect insurance against idiosyncratic shocks. Our model emphasizes a tension between worker-firm wage bargains and consumption smoothing: entry wages respond to expected future severance payments by tilting downwards, which runs counter to having a smooth consumption path. Quantitatively, we find that these wage-shifting effects are sizable enough for severance payments to produce large welfare losses. Our assessment contrasts sharply with previous studies that restricted the extent of worker-firm bargaining to analyze the welfare implications of severance payments
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang