Erschienen in:Discussion Papers on Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, 5/2018
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (30 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3291358
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 27, 2018 erstellt
Beschreibung:
In this paper, we introduce a solution concept generalizing the Harsanyi non-transferable utility (NTU) value to cooperative games with incomplete information. The so-defined S-solution is characterized by virtual utility scales that extend the Harsanyi-Shapley fictitious weighted utility transfer procedure. We construct a three-player cooperative game in which Myerson's [Cooperative games with incomplete information. Int. J. Game Theory, 13, 1984, pp. 69-96] generalization of the Shapley NTU value does not capture some “negative” externality generated by the adverse selection. However, when we explicitly compute the S-solution in this game, it turns out that it prescribes a more intuitive outcome which takes into account the above mentioned informational externality