Colonnello, Stefano
[Verfasser:in]
;
Efing, Matthias
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Zucchi, Francesca
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Shareholder Bargaining Power and the Emergence of Empty Creditors
Erschienen in:Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper ; No. 16-17
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (55 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2787062
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 29, 2018 erstellt
Beschreibung:
Credit default swaps (CDSs) can create empty creditors who may push borrowers into inefficient bankruptcy but also reduce shareholders' incentives to default strategically. We show theoretically and empirically that the presence and the effects of empty creditors on firm outcomes depend on the distribution of bargaining power among claimholders. Firms are more likely to have empty creditors if these would face powerful shareholders in debt renegotiation. The empirical evidence confirms that more CDS insurance is written on firms with strong shareholders and that CDSs increase the bankruptcy risk of these same firms. The ensuing effect on firm value is negative