Kashyap, Anil K.
[VerfasserIn]
;
Tsomocos, Dimitrios P.
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Vardoulakis, Alexandros
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Optimal Bank Regulation in the Presence of Credit and Run Risk
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 2017 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We modify the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of banking to jointly study various regulations in the presence of credit and run risk. Banks choose between liquid and illiquid assets on the asset side, and between deposits and equity on the liability side. The endogenously determined asset portfolio and capital structure interact to support credit extension, as well as to provide liquidity and risk-sharing services to the real economy. Our modifications create wedges in the asset and liability mix between the private equilibrium and a social planner's equilibrium. Correcting these distortions requires the joint implementation of a capital and a liquidity regulation