Schitter, Christian
[Verfasser:in]
;
Fleiß, Jürgen
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Palan, Stefan
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Erschienen in:Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, University of Graz, Working Paper ; No. 2017-01
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (37 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3007593
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 24, 2017 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This paper investigates the determinants of (dis)honesty of reporters filing unverified claims for money. First, does honest reporting increase when each reporter's unverified claim is made public? We present experimental evidence to this effect. The driver behind this is activation of the preference for appearing honest. Second, does honest reporting increase when it is public knowledge that reporters' claims affect others and reporters are reciprocally affected by others' claims? We find no such effect. Fear of losing out against others who untruthfully claim too much may outweigh honesty and pro-social considerations