Luigjes, Chris
[Verfasser:in]
;
Wood, Donna
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Vandenbroucke, Frank
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Institutional Moral Hazard in the Multi-Tiered Regulation of Unemployment in Canada – Background Paper
Anmerkungen:
In: Centre for European Policy Studies (2015)
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 2015 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This paper has been written in preparation of a research project funded by the European Commission (on the Feasibility and Added Value of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme, contract VC/2015/0006). This paper adds information and detailed analysis to the following deliverable of that research project: Institutional Moral Hazard in the Multi-tiered Regulation of Unemployment and Social Assistance Benefits and Activation - A summary of eight country case studies; but it was not a deliverable. We use the concept ‘institutional moral hazard' to analyse intergovernmental relations within multi-tiered welfare states, specifically the domain of in unemployment-related benefits and related activation policies (the ‘regulation of unemployment'). This paper is one of eight separate case studies, it focuses on Canada. Responsibilities in the Canadian regulation of unemployment are divided between the federal government and the provinces. The federal government is responsible for unemployment insurance benefits, the provinces for social assistance and activation of all caseloads. Provincial activation responsibilities are loosely regulated by bilateral agreements with the federal government. Even though this system generates institutional moral hazard, it does not seem to be a major federal concern. The regulation of unemployment is characterised by a high level of provincial autonomy