Mechtenberg, Lydia
[Verfasser:in]
;
Muehlheusser, Gerd
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Roider, Andreas
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Erschienen in:CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 6394
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (60 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2952276
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 14, 2017 erstellt
Beschreibung:
Whistle-blowing by employees plays a major role in uncovering corporate fraud. Various recent laws aim at improving protection of whistle-blowers and enhancing their willingness to report. Evidence on the effectiveness of such legislation is, however, scarce. Moreover, critics have raised worries about fraudulent claims by low-productivity employees. We study these issues in a theory-guided lab experiment. Easily attainable (“belief-based”) protection indeed leads to more reports, both truthful and fraudulent. Fraudulent claims dilute prosecutors' incentives to investigate, and thereby hamper deterrence. These effects are ameliorated under more stringent (“fact-based”) protection