Erschienen in:VATT Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 83
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (34 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2890822
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 28, 2016 erstellt
Beschreibung:
The effectiveness of transfer programs can be significantly reduced if eligible individuals fail to apply for them. In this paper we study the impact of information provision on the take-up of social benefits. We exploit the implementation of the guarantee pension program in Finland in 2011, which offered a minimum monthly pension (688 euros) to low-income pensioners. The Finnish Social Insurance Institution sent information letters and application forms to a portion of the eligible population a month before implementation. We find clear evidence that this mailing significantly increased take-up and prompted pensioners to apply sooner, showing that simple and inexpensive mailings can have a large effect on benefit take-up among individuals outside the labor force