Aruoba, S. Borağan
[VerfasserIn]
;
Drazen, Allan
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Vlaicu, Razvan
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 14, 2017 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This paper proposes a structural approach to measuring the effects of electoral accountability. We estimate a political agency model with imperfect information in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection effects, using data on U.S. governors. We find that the possibility of reelection provides a significant incentive for incumbents to exert effort, that is, a disciplining effect. We also find a positive but weaker selection effect. According to our model, the widely-used two-term regime improves voter welfare by 4.2% compared to a one-term regime and better voter information about the effort of the governors would further increase voter welfare by up to 0.5%