Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 11, 2017 erstellt
Beschreibung:
In this paper, I examine duopoly with multi-services, where firms offer delivery prices and mill prices at the same time, and each consumer chooses one of them. In the equilibria, firms specialize in delivery services even if their transport costs are higher than consumers'. This result is robust to the monopoly market, and robust to convexity or concavity of the transport cost function. I also introduce a generalized model with random utility, which nests a model by Furlong et al. (1983) and (a special case of) this study, and explain that the contrasting results of the two nested models are governed by the distribution of value of the goods. If goods have a large support of distribution, the monopolist tend to benefit from a non-degenerate combination of a delivery price and a mill price. If goods have a small support or a disjoint support with a large gap between segments, the monopolist tend to benefit from specialization to delivery