Bastani, Spencer
[Verfasser:in]
;
Blumkin, Tomer
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Micheletto, Luca
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Anti-Discrimination Legislation and the Efficiency-Enhancing Role of Mandatory Parental Leave
Erschienen in:CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 5917
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (45 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2798612
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 30, 2016 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We study a setting where anti-discrimination legislation gives rise to adverse selection in the labor market. Firms rely on nonlinear compensation contracts to screen workers who differ in their family/career orientation. This results in a labor market equilibrium where career-oriented workers are offered an inefficiently low duration of parental leave. In addition, family-oriented workers are offered lower wages as compared to their equally skilled career-oriented counterparts. We demonstrate the usefulness of mandatory parental leave rules in mitigating the distortion in the labor market and derive conditions under which a Pareto improvement is possible. We also characterize the optimal parental leave policy and highlight the possibility for parental leave legislation to eliminate the wage penalty of family-oriented workers by supporting pooling employment contracts