Erschienen in:CREAM (Center for Research in Economics and Management) Publication ; No. 1-2016
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (23 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2778533
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 10, 2016 erstellt
Beschreibung:
In this paper, we investigate an incomplete information model of generalized second price auctions with allocative externalities originating from the heterogeneous match rates of bidders. A novel feature of our model is that it generates endogenous click-through rates (CTRs). In this setting, we establish existence of symmetric efficient equilibria for common classes of primitives. This contrasts with the findings of Gomes and Sweeney (2014), who study a similar model but with fixed CTRs. Moreover, non-existence results require strong assumptions on the primitives of the model. We conclude that existence of equilibria in GSP with incomplete information is quite general