Anmerkungen:
In: Finance Research Letters, Forthcoming
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 30, 2015 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This internet appendix provides additional results that complement the main results of the paper. In the first part, we show the results of the self-selection model that incorporates the observation that target firms may self-select not to delist from the stock markets after takeovers. In the second part, we employ a propensity score matching model to address the potential endogeneity between CEO turnover and subsequent firm performance.The paper "The Effect of CEO Departure on Target Firms' Post-Takeover Performance: Evidence from Not-Delisting Target Firms" to which these Appendices apply is available at the following URL: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=2684064" http://ssrn.com/abstract=2684064