• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: Government Fiscal Efforts vs. Labour Union Strikes. Strategic Substitutes or Complements?
  • Beteiligte: Castellani, Massimiliano [VerfasserIn]; Fanelli, Luca [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]; Savioli, Marco [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
  • Erschienen: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2015]
  • Erschienen in: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N° 1013
  • Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (22 p)
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2622033
  • Identifikator:
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 23, 2015 erstellt
  • Beschreibung: To unveil the strategic interaction between the government and the labour union in a unionised economy, a policy-game model is estimated by cointegrated Vector Autoregressive system using Italian quarterly data (1960-2009) on government budget surplus (fiscal efforts), hours not worked (strikes), unemployment and real wages. The long-run cointegration relationships are interpreted as the players' reaction functions and the long-run equilibrium as the equilibrium of the game. The identification of the long-run cointegration relationships allows indeed to determine if efforts and strikes are strategic complements or strategic substitutes. Finally, speed of long-run adjustment provides insights about the effectiveness of government and labour union strategies
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