Calem, Paul S.
[VerfasserIn]
;
Lambie-Hanson, Lauren
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Nakamura, Leonard I.
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Erschienen in:FRB of Philadelphia Working Paper ; No. 15-11
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (37 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2574689
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 2015 erstellt
Beschreibung:
Home appraisals are produced for millions of residential mortgage transactions each year, but appraisals are rarely below the transaction price. We exploit a unique data set to show that the mortgage application process creates an incentive to substitute the transaction price for the true appraised value when the latter is lower. We relate the frequency of information loss (appraisals set equal to transaction price) to market conditions and other factors that plausibly determine the degree of distortion. Information loss in appraisals may increase the procyclicality of housing booms and busts