Ansink, Erik
[VerfasserIn]
;
Gengenbach, Michael
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Weikard, Hans-Peter
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Erschienen in:Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 15-001/VIII
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (22 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2545898
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 6, 2015 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water while other agents can take some of the river water that passes their territory