Cox, Gary W.
[Verfasser:in]
;
North, Douglass C.
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Weingast, Barry R.
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 13, 2015 erstellt
Beschreibung:
Why do developing countries fail to adopt the institutions and policies that promote development? Our answer is the violence trap. Key political reforms — opening access and reducing rents — are typically feasible only when the domestic economy reaches a given level of complexity (for reasons we specify); yet complex economies typically can emerge only when key political reforms are already in place (for standard reasons). The interdependence of political reform and economic complexity entails violence because, as we show, unreformed polities lack adaptive efficiency. The literature sparked by Lipset's modernization thesis has operationalized “economic development” as a higher GDP per capita. Building on Steuart, we view development as creating a more complex economy whose workings will be more seriously disrupted by political violence. Empirically, we show that economic complexity (as measured by the Hidalgo-Hausmann index) strongly deters coups, even controlling for GDP per capita and level of democracy