Erschienen in:Banque de France Working Paper ; No. 481
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (28 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2336033
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 17, 2014 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This paper examines the sensitivity of NFC lending to banks' capital ratios and their supervisory capital requirements. We use a unique database for the French banking sector between 2003 and 2011 combining confidential bank-level Bank Lending Survey answers with the discretionary capital requirements set by the supervisory authority. We find that on average, more capital means more credit. But the elasticity of lending to capital depends on the intensity of the supervisory capital constraint. More supervisory capital constrained banks tend to have a slower credit growth than unconstrained banks. We also find that the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans granted may be considered a transmission channel for supervisory requirements. More supervisory capital constrained banks tend to be more reactive to this ratio than unconstrained banks. The former are more prone to reduce credit allocation after a rise in non-performing loans than the latter