Cerasi, Vittoria
[VerfasserIn]
;
Fedele, Alessandro
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Miniaci, Raffaele
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Product Market Competition and Collateralized Debt
Erschienen in:University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper ; No. 238
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (31 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2294024
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 1, 2013 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This paper presents a model where bank credit depends upon borrowers' product market structure. We show that a larger number of competitors in the industry may increase credit availability by enhancing the resale value of the collateralized productive assets. We also study how this benefi t of competition is affected by the existence of outsiders willing to bid for the collateralized productive assets of the insiders. Our model encompasses the standard case of Cournot competition either when the default probability goes to zero or when there are multiple outsiders bidding for the productive assets. We test the empirical implications of the theoretical analysis exploiting information on the access to finance of small and medium Italian fi rms and fi nd supportive evidence