Anmerkungen:
In: BIS Paper No. 65l
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 1, 2012 erstellt
Beschreibung:
Serious fiscal vulnerabilities arising from many years of high government/GDP ratios have created new and complex interactions between public debt management and monetary policy. Although their formal mandates have not changed, recent balance sheet policies of many central banks have tended to blur the separation of their policies from fiscal policy. The mandates of debt management offices have usually had a microeconomic focus (viz, minimising longer-term borrowing costs, while limiting refunding risks). Such mandates have usually avoided any explicit macroeconomic policy dimension but some major policy overlaps are latent. What is needed is a policy framework for all official actions that affect the maturity structure of government debt in the hands of the public. This requires more analysis of the macroeconomics of government debt management. A full debate about the allocation of functional responsibilities would have to take account not only of the economics, but also of political and institutional constraints. There are operational advantages in having in place appropriate governance arrangements that serve to forestall short-sighted policies and hold specific institutions accountable for their mandates.Full publication: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=2078895" Threat of fiscal dominance?