Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 25, 2010 erstellt
Beschreibung:
In this paper we study the emergence of firm asymmetry as an equilibrium outcome. We consider differentiated Cournot and Bertrand duopolies where firms endogenously select their organizational governance and their timing strategy for the market stage. It is shown that for both market structures asymmetric equilibria may occur, although they are more likely in price-setting environments. For Cournot competition, in an asymmetric equilibrium one firm selects market leadership and is owner-managed. The rival firm hires a manager, motivates this manager by writing an appropriate incentive contract, and moves late at the market stage. In Bertrand competition, both firms always select different timing strategies at the market stage. Depending on the costs of hiring a manager and the degree of substitutability between products, they mayalso select different organizational structures. Surprisingly, for Bertrand competition we observe that firms' profits are non-monotonic in the substitutability between firms' products, so that firms might be better off if the intensity of competition between firms increases. Finally, we also investigate if a first-mover or a second-mover advantage occurs in these equilibria