Funaki, Yukihiko
[Verfasser:in]
;
Houba, Harold
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Motchenkova, Evgenia
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpandable Infrastructures
Erschienen in:TILEC Discussion Paper ; No. 2012-041
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (41 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2179488
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 22, 2012 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We consider price-fee competition in bilateral oligopolies with perfectly-divisible goods, non expandable infrastructures, concentrated agents on both sides, and constant marginal costs. We define and characterize stable market outcomes. Buyers exclusively trade with the supplier with whom they achieve maximal bilateral joint welfare. Prices equal marginal costs. Threats to switch suppliers set maximal fees. These also arise from a negotiation model that extends price competition. Competition in both prices and fees necessarily emerges. It improves welfare compared to price competition, but consumer surpluses do not increase. The minimal infrastructure achieving maximal aggregate welfare differs from the one that protects buyers most