Aidt, Toke Skovsgaard
[VerfasserIn]
;
Albornoz, Facundo
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Gassebner, Martin
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Erschienen in:CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 3957
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (34 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2162839
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 17, 2012 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's (American Economic Review 91, 2001) model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from in-ternational financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find in a world sample from 1970 to 2002 that the anticipation of receiving new programs immediately after a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival