Gomis-Porqueras, Pedro
[VerfasserIn]
;
Julien, Benoit
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Wang, Chengsi
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Erschienen in:UNSW Australian School of Business Research Paper ; No. 2012-26
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (40 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2040983
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 11, 2012 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We consider a directed search environment where capacity constrained sellers reach uncoordinated buyers through costly advertising while buyers observed all prices probabilistically. We show that: (i) the equilibrium advertising intensity has an inverted U-shape in market tightness, (ii) the equilibrium advertising intensity is higher under an auction mechanism than under posted pricing, and (iii) the equilibrium price and measure of informed buyers may {be positively correlated} even in large markets