Dürsch, Peter
[Verfasser:in]
;
Oechssler, Joerg
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Schipper, Burkhard C.
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 26, 2012 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games