Erschienen in:Columbia Business School Research Paper ; No. 12-17
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (41 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.1962906
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 2011 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This paper studies optimal relational contracts when the value of the relationship between contracting parties is not commonly known. I consider a principal-agent setting where the principal has persistent private information about her outside option. I show that if the principal has the bargaining power, she wants to understate her outside option to provide strong incentives and then renege on promised payments, while if the uninformed agent has the bargaining power, the principal wants to overstate her outside option to capture more surplus. I characterize how information is revealed, how the relationship evolves, and how this depends on bargaining power