Evidence for Dynamic Contracts in Sovereign Bank Lending

Medientyp: E-Book

Titel: Evidence for Dynamic Contracts in Sovereign Bank Lending

Beteiligte: Benczur, Peter [Verfasser:in]; Ilut, Cosmin L. [Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]

Erschienen: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2011]

Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (31 p)

Sprache: Englisch

Entstehung:

Anmerkungen: In: Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper No. 96
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 1, 2011 erstellt

Beschreibung: This paper presents direct evidence for self-enforcing dynamic contracts in sovereign bank lending. Unlike the existing empirical literature, its instrumental variables method allows for distinguishing a direct influence of past repayment problems on current spreads (a punishment effect in prices) from an indirect effect through higher expected future default probabilities. Such a punishment provides positive surplus to lenders after a default, a feature that characterizes dynamic contracts. Using data on bank loans to developing countries between 1973-1981 and constructing continuous variables for credit history, we find evidence that most of the influence of past repayment problems is through the direct, punishment channel

Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang

Evidence for Dynamic Contracts in Sovereign Bank Lending

Merkliste

Exemplare

Bereichsbibliothek DrePunct – Außenmagazin

Bereichsbibliothek DrePunct – Magazin

Zentralbibliothek – Außenmagazin

Nur in Feld suchen:

Zuletzt gesuchte Begriffe:

Bereichsbibliothek DrePunct – Außenmagazin

Bereichsbibliothek DrePunct – Magazin

Zentralbibliothek – Außenmagazin