Erschienen in:Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper ; No. 2190
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (31 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
In: Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2190
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 23, 2010 erstellt
Beschreibung:
Theoretical investigations have examined both anti-competitive and efficiency-inducing rationales for vertical bundling, making empirical evidence important to understanding its welfare implications. We use an extensive dataset on full-line forcing contracts between movie distributors and video retailers to empirically measure the impact of vertical bundling on welfare. We identify and measure three primary effects of full-line forcing contracts: market coverage, leverage, and efficiency. We find that bundling increases market coverage and efficiency, but has little impact on one distributor gaining leverage over another. As a result, we estimate that full-line forcing contracts increased consumer and producer surplus in this application