• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: The Research of Investor Protection Under the Common Law Framework
  • Beteiligte: Zhihui, Gu [Verfasser:in]
  • Erschienen: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2010]
  • Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (27 p)
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1625669
  • Identifikator:
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 16, 2010 erstellt
  • Beschreibung: Based on the Chinese Confucianism, the paper reasons the principle of Common Law and embeds the agency theory into the Tort Law. And then, the paper builds a mathematical model to analysis this problem. There are several conclusions in this paper. At first, effective investor protection will lead to the shareholding ratio of controller decreased with time, which is independent of whether or not litigation cost exist or how to share the litigation cost. Secondly, if given the litigation cost, the effective law of investor protection will evolve following self-reinforcement path. But if given ratio of penalty, the effective law will lead to the litigation cost increased with time. And who pay the litigation cost can not influence this conclusion. At last, pay the litigation cost by minority shareholder or controller will lead to the litigation cost increased or decreased with penalty
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang