Erschienen in:CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 2854
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (34 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.1513170
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 2009 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This paper analyses tax competition and tax coordination in a model where capital flows occur in the form of mergers and acquisitions, rather than greenfield investment. In this framework, we show that differences in residence based taxes do not necessarily distort international ownership patterns. Moreover, tax competition yields globally efficient levels of source based corporate income taxes if residence based taxes on capital income are absent. In contrast, in the presence of residence based taxes on dividends, source based corporate income taxes are inefficiently high. The widespread view that tax coordination is less urgent if residence based taxes are available may therefore be misguided