Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 2, 2011 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We find the likelihood of turnover in the CEO and CFO positions is significantly higher in the aftermath of option backdating (in comparison to industry-matched and propensity-score-matched control firms). Turnover is particularly high for severe cases of backdating, namely, when a regulatory investigation occurs or the financial statements are restated, and turnover is lower when directors are also compensated with backdated options. We find the displaced managers are punished by the labor market in that they are less likely than control firm managers to be rehired at comparable positions -- even when backdating at their former employer was not severe. We also observe that backdating firms restructure CEO compensation to rely less on stock options, especially when they hire a new CEO. Finally, we learn that the higher turnover extends to the General Counsel