Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 16, 2022 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We examine the effect of CEO marital status on corporate cash holdings. Consistent with the agency framework, we find that firms with single CEOs hold more cash compared to otherwise similar firms with married CEOs. Our findings suggest that corporate tax avoidance and lower dividend payouts are the potential channels. Further analyses show that the excess cash held by single CEOs has a negative effect on firm value. Our findings survive a battery of robustness checks to ease endogeneity and selection bias, including propensity score matching, difference-in-differences estimation, and an instrumental variable regression, confirming that results are not simply reflecting innate heterogeneity in preferences. Overall, our findings indicate that a variable outside the common firm- and macro-level determinants, CEO marital status, can significantly influence corporate policies