Erschienen in:Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ; No. 2022-05
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (18 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.4068130
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 28, 2022 erstellt
Beschreibung:
Unlike produced commodities, the extraction and sale of oil or natural gas is an "asset swap": assets stored in the ground are converted into financial assets. The value of assets in the ground is reduced by the amount taken out and sold. This is important for assessing the coercive power of the threat of implementing an export embargo. Even if the country affected by the embargo is ruled by an autocratic kleptocrat, who appropriates all the revenues from resource sales, the sanctioning effect is close to zero in a functioning financial market environment. However, if the autocrat considers her future government power to be at risk and, at the same time, can bunker the extraction proceeds in a financial safe-haven, then the embargo leads to expected wealth losses for the autocrat. The expected wealth losses increase in the difference between the likelihood of retaining power and the wealth security of the financial assets in a safe haven