• Medientyp: E-Book
  • Titel: SEC Rule 14a-8 Shareholder Proposals : No-Action Requests, Determinants, and the Role of SEC Staff
  • Beteiligte: Burke, Gregory [Verfasser:in]
  • Erschienen: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2022]
  • Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (65 p)
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3739071
  • Identifikator:
  • Schlagwörter: Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ; No-Action Letters ; Rule 14a-8 ; Shareholder Proposals ; Corporate Governance ; SEC staff experience
  • Entstehung:
  • Anmerkungen: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 28, 2020 erstellt
  • Beschreibung: Under SEC Rule 14a-8, shareholders have the right to petition management to include a topic for vote on the annual proxy statement. In response, management may request no-action relief from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) staff to exclude unwelcome proposals. Using a sample of 3,040 no-action letter responses from the SEC between 2008 and 2019, I examine the determinants of the SEC staff’s decision to grant no-action relief. I find the legal characteristics, pressures on the SEC staff, and proposal attributes have a statistically significant association with the SEC’s decision. Beyond these factors, I find evidence individual SEC staff members differ in the likelihood they grant no-action relief. On average, these staff members appear to add value as evidenced by a positive market response to their decisions, but this favorable valuation effect is concentrated among relatively more experienced staff
  • Zugangsstatus: Freier Zugang