Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 17, 2021 erstellt
Beschreibung:
We analyze information disclosure as a policy instrument for contagion management indecentralized environments. A benevolent planner (e.g., the government) tests a fraction ofthe population to learn the infection rate. Individuals meet randomly and exert vigilanceeffort. Efforts factor in a passage function to reduce the probability of contagion. We analyze the information disclosure policy that maximizes society’s expected welfare. Whenefforts are strategic substitutes, we provide, separately, sufficient and necessary conditionsfor full disclosure to be optimal. When efforts are strategic complements, the optimal policy features obfuscation. Here, pooling intermediate infection rates is optimal wheneverindividuals’ equilibrium effort jumps from no-effort (inaction) to full-effort (frenzy)