Erschienen in:CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 4473
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (17 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2359395
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 25, 2013 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This paper shows that the inefficiency of fiscal decentralization in the presence of spillovers, a main tenet of the decentralization literature, is overturned in a particular transportation context. In a monocentric city where road (bridge) capacity is financed by budget-balancing user fees, decentralized capacity choices (made by individual zones within the city) generate the social optimum despite the presence of spillovers. This conclusion is closely tied to the famous self-financing theorem of transportation economics