Erschienen in:Bank of Greece Working Paper ; No. 237
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (50 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.4196596
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 1, 2017 erstellt
Beschreibung:
Using a data set of bank loans to Greek firms during the period of the Greek sovereign crisis, we provide empirical evidence that firms affiliated with groups are less likely to default on their bank loan during a credit crunch, compared to stand-alone firms. We show that the lower default risk of affiliated firms is due to access to the internal capital market in the form of intra-group loans and to enhanced access to the restricted external financing. Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence that banks evaluate positively the group membership and that they collect private information about the delinquent affiliated firms from other firms that belong to the group. Finally, we find that banks are more likely to show forbearance against affiliated firms with nonperforming loans, in order to delay additional loan charge-offs and to preserve their relationship with the rest of the group