Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 2005 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This paper investigates the relationship between vertical integration and the importance of control rights under incomplete contracts. Our setting is the U.S regional airline industry. Regional airlines operate flights for major carriers under the major's brand. The majors market the regionals' flights as their own. There is substantial heterogeneity in whether or not regionals are owned by the major for which they operate. Furthermore, several majors own some of their regional partners while also contracting with others. We develop a simple framework that illustrates the benefits and costs of vertical integration between a major and regional. We argue that when unforeseen disruptions create the need for schedule adjustments - as frequently occurs in the airline industry - the major will internalize the impact of the disruption on its entire network, while the regional will not. Ownership of a regional mitigates this incentive problem by giving the major rights of control over how the regional's physical assets and labor force are used. However, by bringing the regional's labor force "in-house", ownership of a regional may erode some of the labor cost savings that are very reason why majors subcontract certain flights to regionals. Using data on majors' use of regionals in the second quarter of 2000, we test whether majors' choice of organizational form reflects this tradeoff between greater control and lower labor costs. Our results provide support for our analytical framework. We find that owned regionals are more likely to serve city pairs that are (1) more integrated into the major's network, where externalities not internalized by the regional will be the greatest; and (2) that owned regionals are more likely to serve city pairs with adverse weather conditions, where unforeseen schedule disruptions will be more common