Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 1, 2017 erstellt
Beschreibung:
The release of a new platform version is often preceded by prelaunch activities including a preannouncement of new features, improvements, and other innovations. The information contained within these preannouncements not only shape expectations of distinct but connected sides, e.g., users and developers in a video game platform, but also informs a rival platform in a competitive market. Through a game-theoretic analysis of three different preannouncement strategies (formal, informal, and no-preannouncement) in a duopoly, our re-search furthers the understanding of the role of externality-related information on expectation formation and the associated competitive dynamics. The literature on the role of in-formation in platform competition is limited and as the first to model the use of this information (through preannouncements) as a strategic lever, we characterize the firms’ equilibrium preannouncement strategies under different market conditions including when agents have an option to switch and/or the ability to multi-home. Our findings show a clear relationship between equilibrium preannouncement strategies and agents’ strength of taste preferences. In markets with weak preferences, firms pursue a no-preannouncement strategy in equilibrium to a formal preannouncement strategy where users and developers have strong taste preferences. Overall, our welfare analyses reveal that in a competitive market, firms will prefer not to preannounce their platform features even if preannouncement may in-crease expected network effects. Consumer and social welfare are both higher in multi-homing markets than in single-homing ones